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I.   INTRODUCTION
When Kristine Roselius stepped on to the Seminole Indian Reser-
vation in June of 1994, she thought she was beginning the job of a
lifetime.1 What she did not realize was that by taking a job with the
Seminole Indian Tribe, she may have unwittingly waived the rights
provided to her under federal employment discrimination statutes.2
One year later when she sued the tribe and the tribal corporation,3
claiming sexual harassment, the Seminole Tribe argued that sover-
                                                                                                                   
* The author would like to thank Ann McGinley, Professor of Law at the Florida
State University College of Law, and Tsheneka Tate, without whom this article would not
have been possible.
1. See Donna Leinwand, Seminoles Fight Sexual Harassment Suit, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 12, 1996, at A1 (Broward Co. edition).
2. For a discussion about these federal statutes and how they relate to tribal immu-
nity, see infra Part V.A. Under the doctrine of tribal immunity, tribes also claim anyone
on the reservation waives their rights under state legislation. See Leinwand, supra note 1.
However, this Comment focuses mainly on federal discrimination statutes because it is
more appropriate to obtain jurisdiction over Native Americans in federal court. See id.
3. See Roselius v. McDaniel, No. 95-6887, slip op. at 1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1997) (dis-
missing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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eign immunity barred her suit.4 According to Roselius, her employers
repeatedly touched her, made sexual comments and degrading re-
marks, and even suggested that she could make a “quick $10,000”
from a wealthy client.5
Because Native American tribes and tribal corporations increas-
ingly employ more non-Native Americans,6 the Roselius v. McDaniel 7
case presented pressing issues as to what rights, if any, those em-
ployees have when they become the victims of employment discrimi-
nation. This Comment examines the compelling issue of employment
discrimination claims against tribes and tribal entities. Specifically,
Part II details the facts of the Roselius’ case and the legal issues it
entailed. Part III looks at the changing role of the Native American
tribe as an employer of non-Native Americans. Part IV defines the
doctrine of Native American sovereign immunity as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court, and is followed by Part V’s con-
clusion that sovereign immunity should not bar employment dis-
crimination suits. Part VI illustrates that sound policy justifications
outweigh the application of sovereign immunity to employment dis-
crimination suits by non-Native Americans. Part VII elaborates on
possible remedies available to non-Native American employees expe-
riencing discrimination,8 notwithstanding the application of sover-
eign immunity. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that sovereign
immunity should not act as a bar to all claims of employment dis-
crimination against tribes.
II.   ROSELIUS V. MCDANIELS
Kristine Roselius, with an education in journalism, public ad-
ministration, and Native American studies,9 left her native Iowa in
1994 to accept a job offer with the Seminole Tribe’s “Kissimmee
                                                                                                                   
4. See Leinwand, supra note 1; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dis-
miss at 2-9, Roselius (No. 95-6887).
5. See Leinwand, supra note 1; see also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5-6, Ro-
selius (No. 95-6887).
6. For a discussion of the increased role of tribes as employers of non-Native Ameri-
cans, see infra Part III.
7. No. 95-6887, slip op. (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1997) (dismissing the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction).
8. “Discrimination” in this context means discrimination against non-Native Ameri-
can employees based on race other than in the context of preference of Native Americans
over whites, as well as discrimination based on gender, national origin, age, and disabili-
ties. Discrimination in the form of a preference for Native Americans over other races by
tribal employers has consistently been found by courts and Congress to be justified as a
means for fighting unemployment and poverty on reservations. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 78-81, 96-99.
9. See Leinwand, supra note 1 (noting that Roselius was a master’s degree candi-
date at the time she accepted the job on the Seminole reservation).
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Billie Swamp Safari” (Safari).10 Roselius wanted to work with Native
Americans and thought the position of public relations coordinator
would be the ideal job for someone with her background.11 Although
she only worked on the reservation for six months, Roselius’ Com-
plaint painted a picture of a working environment that subjected her
to “a continuous barrage of unwelcome sexual harassment.”12
According to Roselius, the harassment began on her very first day
of work.13 Roselius claimed that her supervisor, James McDaniel,
welcomed her to the job by suggesting that she sell her body to a
wealthy Arab client who came to hunt at the Safari.14 McDaniel,
while in the presence of the Safari director, allegedly told her she
could make a “quick $10,000” and said she was foolish for turning
down the offer.15 At first, Roselius thought they were kidding, but
soon she found out that it was a sign of things to come.16 Roselius
claimed that over the next several months, McDaniel asked her to go
to a nudist colony, physically harassed her, told her to “look entic-
ing,” and asked if she would like him to buy her “Chinese massage
balls because women liked to use them to have orgasms.”17 Finally,
Roselius verbally complained of the harassment to another supervi-
sor of the Safari.18 Her employer responded by asking Roselius to
sign a letter refuting her allegations of harassment.19 When Roselius
refused to sign the letter she was fired, despite the fact that she had
received very high ratings in a recent job performance evaluation.20
Roselius filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196421
against McDaniel, the Kissimmee Billie Swamp Safari, the Seminole
Tribe of Florida Community Development Corporation, and the
Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc.,22 She claimed that the tribal busi-
nesses were corporations separate from the tribe and that they
waived any sovereign immunity by adopting a “sue or be sued”
clause.23 According to Roselius, the sue or be sued clause in the cor-
porate charter of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Inc. was included for
                                                                                                                   
10. See id.
11. See Leinwand, supra note 1; see also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5, Roselius
(No. 95-6887).
12. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5, Roselius (No. 95-6887).
13. See Leinwand, supra note 1.
14. See id.; see also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5, Roselius (No. 95-6887).
15. Leinwand, supra note 1; see also Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5, Roselius
(No. 95-6887).
16. See Leinwand, supra note 1.
17. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5-6, Roselius (No. 95-6887).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 6.
20. See id. (noting that Roselius saved the letter).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). For a discussion of Title VII’s protection and
how it relates to tribal immunity, see infra Part V.A.
22. See Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 5-6, Roselius (No. 95-6887).
23. See id. at 3-4.
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the express purpose of allowing tribal companies to become more
economically viable.24 Further, Roselius argued that the clause al-
lowed the tribe’s economic entities to be sued to make them more at-
tractive to outside investors.25 The tribe responded by claiming that
Roselius’ case could not be heard because of the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity.26
Unfortunately for Roselius, on August 7, 1997, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the tribe’s
Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.27 The court
specifically held that because Roselius was employed by the tribal
government and not the tribal corporate entity, the tribe’s sovereign
immunity barred her lawsuit.28 Surprisingly, the court’s order did
not discuss the policy implications of the sovereign immunity appli-
cation.29
III.   THE CHANGING ROLE OF TRIBES AS EMPLOYERS
The Southern District Court’s decision is a compelling example of
the harsh results that continue to arise as tribal businesses in-
creasingly employ more non-Native Americans. In recent years, the
once relatively isolated tribes have begun employing non-Native
Americans at an increasingly rapid rate as they have expanded their
economic enterprises.30 This is due primarily to the advent of large-
scale casino gambling on Native American reservations31 but also
                                                                                                                   
24. See id. at 4.
25. See id.
26. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 2-8, Roselius (No. 95-
6887).
27. See Roselius, No. 95-6887, slip op. at 9-11 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 1997) (final order
granting the tribe’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds).
28. See id. at 9 (holding that Roselius could not produce sufficient evidence to raise a
material issue of fact that she was employed by the tribal corporate entity).
29. See id. Not all was lost for Kristine Roselius. The Seminole Tribe of Florida set-
tled the case with Roselius for approximately $20,000.00, despite the case’s dismissal.
Telephone Interview with P. Tim Howard, Esq., Managing Partner of Howard & Associ-
ates, P.A. (Jan. 15, 1997).
30. See generally William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and
State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365,
1366 (1995) (stating that many tribes now are “significant employers,” hiring hundreds of
people); Keith David Bilezerian, Note, Ante Up or Fold: States Attempt to Play Their Hand
While Indian Casinos Cash In, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 463, 463 (1995); William V. Vetter,
Doing Business With Indians and the Three “S”es: Secretarial Approval, Sovereign Immu-
nity, and Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 169, 169 (1994); Vicki J. Limas,
Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes: Re-
specting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681, 681 (1994); Michael
M. Pacheco, Toward a Truer Sense of Sovereignty: Fiduciary Duty in Indian Corporations,
39 S.D. L. REV. 49, 49 (1994).
31. The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th
Cir. 1981), paved the way for tribes to conduct bingo games for pay on reservations. See
id. at 314-16. In the 10 years following the Butterworth decision, over 100 tribes across
the nation opened high-stakes bingo parlors. See James J. Belliveau, Note, Casino Gam-
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encompasses many other businesses owned and operated by in-
creasingly corporate-savvy tribes.32
The employment discrimination issue is compounded by the fact
that few tribes have policies in place to deal with allegations of sex-
ual harassment or other forms of discrimination.33 Cases like Ro-
selius’ present the issue of whether non-Native Americans waive
their rights under federal employment law by accepting jobs on res-
ervations. Also at issue is whether the justifications for tribal immu-
nity outweigh the rights of employees who find themselves the vic-
tims of a tribe’s employment discrimination. To answer these ques-
tions, the doctrine of sovereign tribal immunity in general must first
be examined.34
IV.   THE DOCTRINE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Currently, much debate exists over the exact nature of tribal sov-
ereignty, including the very source of the doctrine. One theory sug-
gests that Native American tribes are inherently sovereign because
they were self-governing entities before Europeans colonized North
America.35 Under this theory, tribal immunity pre-dates the forma-
tion of the United States, and therefore, the U.S. government has no
right to modify or limit this immunity.36 The more widely accepted
theory, however, is that by nature of their conquest by the Europe-
                                                                                                                   
bling Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: Narragansett Tribal Sovereignty Versus
Rhode Island Gambling Laws, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 389, 401 (1993). The Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994), opened the door to casinos on reservations,
and Native American gaming is now a multi-billion-dollar-a-year industry. See generally
Mike Williams, Indians Lose Court Fight on Casinos, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 28,
1996, at A1; Bilezerian, supra note 30, at 463 (citing the example of the Mashantucket Pe-
quot Tribe which numbers about 275 members but employs 6900 workers on a projected
payroll of $226 million a year).
32. Examples include tribally owned banks, manufacturers, and investment corpora-
tions with revenues in the millions. See Pacheco, supra note 30, at 49.
33. See generally Leinwand, supra note 1 (quoting professor Kirke Kickingbird, direc-
tor of the Native American Legal Resource Center at Oklahoma City University, stating
that “[t]he tribes really haven’t contemplated the issue for the most part and don’t have
anything in place”). In Roselius’ case, the Seminole tribe had no set personnel policies
dealing with employment discrimination. See id.
34. For a comparison between tribal immunity and the sovereign immunity of states
and foreign nations, see infra text accompanying notes 136-40.
35. See generally G. William Rice, Employment in Indian Country: Considerations
Respecting Tribal Regulation of the Employer-Employee Relationship, 72 N.D. L. REV. 267,
275-77 (1996); Steve E. Dietrich, Tribal Businesses and the Uncertain Reach of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity: A Statutory Solution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 113, 117 (1992); United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) (stating that tribes have the inherent
power of a limited sovereign that has never been extinguished); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 140-42 (1982) (stating that tribes have the inherent right to
tax non-Native Americans within the tribal territory).
36. See Dietrich, supra note 35, at 117 (stating that “tribal powers flow from an
original sovereignty, and are not derived from federal authority”); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at
322-23; Rice, supra note 35, at 275.
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ans and later the United States, the Native Americans’ sovereignty
no longer inherently exists but is permitted by the government.37
Under this theory, the federal government has the ability to abro-
gate tribal immunity as it wishes.38
In Johnson v. M’Intosh ,39 the Supreme Court first set forth the
idea that the federal government allows tribal immunity as a matter
of discretion. Chief Justice Marshall stated that the “discovery” of
North America by Europeans “necessarily diminished” the Native
Americans’ sovereign immunity.40 The Court further clarified the
role of Native Americans in the American legal system in a pair of
cases decided almost a decade later. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia ,41
Marshall asserted that Native American tribes were not “foreign
states,” but were akin to the states or “domestic dependent nations”
capable of managing their own affairs.42 Worcester v. Georgia ,43 de-
cided one year later, held that Georgia laws would not apply in
Cherokee territory.44 Worcester characterized the Native American
tribes as “distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights,” with the exception of the ability to deal
with foreign powers.45 Cherokee Nation  and Worcester established a
broad interpretation of tribal immunity that would not be signifi-
cantly reduced for almost 150 years.
Despite the original breadth given to tribal immunity, the recent
trend among courts has been to place increasing restrictions on the
application of the doctrine.46 This trend of limiting tribal immunity
was ushered in by the 1978 Supreme Court case of Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe .47 In Oliphant, the Court placed the first
major restriction on tribal immunity since M’Intosh. The Court ruled
that sovereign immunity did not allow tribes to exert criminal juris-
diction over non-Native Americans.48 Oliphant asserted that Native
American nations are dependent on the United States,49 and re-
tained only “quasi-sovereignty authority” restricted to powers consis-
                                                                                                                   
37. See, e.g, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribes, 435 U.S. 191, 207-08 (1978) (rec-
ognizing that Native American tribes are prohibited from exercising authority expressly
terminated by Congress and inconsistent with their status as tribes).
38. See id.
39. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
40. Id. at 574.
41. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
42. Id. at 17.
43. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
44. See id. at 561.
45. Id. at 559.
46. See, e.g., Dietrich, supra note 35, at 110-15; Rice, supra note 35, at 278.
47. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 207.
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tent with their “domestic dependent” status.50 Further, the Court
implied that the immunity of the tribes would be limited “so as not to
conflict with the interests” of the United States.51 The Oliphant deci-
sion paved the way for other cases that have further limited sover-
eign immunity.52 Exactly how far the limitations on immunity will
extend is unclear. However, several cases since Oliphant have reaf-
firmed the sovereign power of tribes in certain areas.53
Notwithstanding conflicting lower court decisions, the Supreme
Court has settled several important issues with respect to the
breadth of sovereign immunity. From the tribes’ perspective, the
most important of these is that tribes have virtually unlimited power
over “internal affairs.”54 The second well-established doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity is that states do not have the authority to infringe
on tribal self-governance.55 Finally, it has long been recognized that
Congress has plenary power to limit tribal immunity.56 Despite these
few relatively uncontested tenants of tribal immunity, how far the
                                                                                                                   
50. Id. at 208.
51. Id. at 209.
52. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 549 (1981) (holding that the
tribe lacked the power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Native Americans on non-
Native-American-owned land within a reservation); Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 720
(1983) (holding that sovereign immunity does not include the power to regulate liquor
sales on reservations).
53. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (holding that tribes have
the power to punish their own members); Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S.
134, 135 (1980) (affirming the power of tribes to tax the activities of non-Native Americans
on reservations); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 130-32 (1982) (similar
holding).
54. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 132 (stating that tribes have the inherent right to tax
members and non-members on their land); National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe
of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 846 (1984) (finding that although power over internal affairs is
not unlimited, courts must inquire whether any express limitations prevent the tribe from
acting, not whether tribes have the authority to act); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978); Limas, supra note 30, at 685.
55. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560 (1832); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
223 (1959); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983). However,
this doctrine has been somewhat undermined by what is commonly called the “federal
preemption theory.” Under the federal preemption theory, the reason states do not have
jurisdiction over tribes is not due to sovereign tribal immunity, but due to the preemption
of federal courts over state courts with respect to Native American affairs. See White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 136 (1980); Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona
St. Tax Comm., 448 U.S. 160, 160 (1980). Under this theory, it has sometimes been found
that where federal law does not allow a case against a tribe, the states may in fact have
jurisdiction. See also McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 (1973); New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
56. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 379 (1896); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 379 (1886); Martinez, 436 U.S. at 56; Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practi-
cal Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137,
1139-40 (1990); Nell J. Newton, Federal Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limi-
tations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 195 (1984) (asserting that only one federal statute has
been struck down on grounds that Congress exceeded its authority over tribes).
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doctrine extends and what it protects continues to be ambiguous and
confusing.57
V.   EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS AGAINST TRIBAL
BUSINESSES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
A.   Congress’s Use of Its Plenary Power to Limit Tribal Immunity
Title VII protects employees from discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin.58 Without the protection of
Title VII, plaintiffs such as Kristine Roselius would be excluded from
bringing sexual harassment claims because other federal discrimina-
tion statutes do not protect women from sexual harassment.59
Title VII states that Native American tribes are not considered
“employers” under the Act, and thus cannot be held responsible for
acts of discrimination.60 However, the United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota has held that this language does not
exempt tribal businesses from Title VII claims by non-Native Ameri-
cans. In Myrick v. Devils Lake Sioux Manufacturing Corp. ,61 a corpo-
ration with a Native American tribe as the majority owner at-
tempted to claim immunity from a race and age discrimination suit
brought under Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).62 The tribe claimed they were exempt under the Native
American tribe exception to Title VII,63 and that the ADEA does not
apply to tribally owned businesses.64 The court ruled that these de-
fenses were “without merit,” and allowed the suit against the tribally
owned business to proceed.65 The court distinguished contradictory
cases such as EEOC v. Cherokee Nation 66 by finding that they “did
not consider the present situation of non-tribal reservation employ-
                                                                                                                   
57. See generally David H. Getches & Charles F. Wilkinson, Cases and Materials on
Federal Indian Law 315 (2d ed. 1986) (stating that “the nuances of tribal sovereign im-
munity . . . are recommended only for the brave”); Rice, supra note 35, at 278 (calling the
“case-by-case” decisions of the Supreme Court a “fog”).
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
59. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994),
does not protect individuals from sexual discrimination, nor does 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (“The term employer . . . does not include (1) the
United States, a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an
Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia . . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 30, at 1367.
61. 718 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.D. 1989).
62. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994); see also Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 754.
63. See Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 756.
64. See id. at 754.
65. Id.
66. 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that the ADEA does not apply to Native
American Tribes).
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ees.”67 According to this reasoning, companies owned by Native
American tribes cannot avoid claims brought under Title VII if those
claims involve a non-Native American employee.68 Although several
cases conflict with Myrick and have held that tribal businesses are
exempt from Title VII, the reasoning of these cases is flawed. In Dille
v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes ,69 the Tenth Circuit held that
former female employees could not bring a sex discrimination suit
under Title VII against an organization comprised solely of Native
American tribes.70 Dille suggests that the language of Title VII
clearly offers broad protection to Native American tribes and all Na-
tive American entities.71 However, without ever considering the dif-
ference between tribal governmental entities and tribal businesses,
the court reasoned that because the statute applies broadly to all
Native Americans, it must likewise apply to a company run by a
conglomeration of tribes.72
Courts have cited another Tenth Circuit case, Wardle v. Ute In-
dian Tribe,73 as support for the application of tribal immunity to dis-
crimination claims by non-Native Americans against tribal busi-
nesses.74 This is, however, a misinterpretation of the Wardle holding.
Wardle, a non-Native American policeman, was discharged by the
tribe, which sought to fill the position with a member of the tribe.75
Wardle brought an employment discrimination claim against the
tribe under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in addition
to other similar claims.76 The court dismissed the suit on the grounds
that Title VII’s express exemption for Native American tribes con-
trols over other, more general federal civil rights statutes and, thus,
no claim could be brought against the tribe by a plaintiff in Wardle’s
situation.77 However, the Tenth Circuit explicitly limited its holding
to the “narrow context” of hiring decisions based on preferences for
Native Americans.78 This holding is consistent with Title VII’s ex-
                                                                                                                   
67. Myrick, 718 F. Supp. at 754 n.1.
68. See id.
69. 801 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986).
70. See id. at 376.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. 623 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. See Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 30, at 1367-68.
75. See Wardle, 623 F.2d at 671.
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Wardle, 623 F.2d at 671-72. The other claims con-
sisted of an unlawful discharge claim under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1994), a claim under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and claims
under an array of other civil rights provisions, specifically 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1988, and
2000d (1994). See id.
77. See Wardle, 623 F.2d at 673.
78. Id. at 672.
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plicit language79 and legislative intent.80 While both Wardle and the
statute itself allow preferential treatment of Native Americans on
and around reservations, neither should be interpreted to allow
tribal businesses to claim immunity against discrimination suits by
non-Native Americans based on other grounds.81
Although some federal employment discrimination statutes ex-
pressly exempt Native American tribes from liability,82 several
opinions have noted that unless a federal statute specifically in-
cludes Native American tribes within its reach, it should be inter-
preted as if tribes are exempt from its remedial provisions.83 In one
of these opinions, EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment & Co n-
struction Co.,84 the Eighth Circuit found that for such a statute to
apply to tribes, it must be demonstrated that the legislation specifi-
cally intended Native Americans tribes to be included.85 In Fond du
Loc, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
brought a claim against a tribally owned business under the ADEA.86
The court reasoned that because there was no affirmative proof that
Congress intended the ADEA to apply to Native American tribes or
tribal entities, there could be no claim asserted under the statute.87
Other cases support the notion that absent a federal statute to the
contrary or express waiver by the tribe, sovereign immunity is ab-
solute.88 These cases imply that tribal corporations are exempt from
employment discrimination claims because there is no statute ex-
plicitly holding them susceptible to suit.
The reasoning in Dille and Fond du Loc is flawed because these
cases either fail to consider or incorrectly interpret the express leg-
islative intent behind Title VII. Contrary to the holdings of these
cases, neither Title VII nor its legislative history explicitly state that
tribal companies that hire non-Native American employees enjoy ab-
solute exemption from the statute. To the contrary, the vague lan-
                                                                                                                   
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(I) (1994) (permitting preferential hiring of Native Ameri-
cans).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 93-99.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
82. The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), ex-
plicitly states that the statute does not apply to tribes. See id. § 12111(5)(B)(i) (stating
that “employer” does not include “an Indian Tribe”). However, neither the ADEA (29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994)), nor section 1981 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)), specifically exclude
Native Americans from their definitions of who may be held liable.
83. See, e.g., EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 938-39 (10th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that the ADEA does not apply to tribes absent express congressional language abro-
gating Native American treaty rights or their sovereign immunity).
84. 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).
85. See id. at 249-51.
86. See id. at 247.
87. See id. at 249-51.
88. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); Maynard v.
Narragansett Indian Tribe, 984 F.2d 14, 16 (1st Cir. 1993).
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guage excluding Native American tribes89 and the legislative purpose
behind it indicate congressional intent to bar Title VII claims only in
very limited situations.90 Specifically, the legislative history demon-
strates an intent to protect tribes from suits in only two situations:
employment decisions specifically involving tribal government,91 and
the preferential hiring of a Native American over a non-Native
American.92
The section of Title VII excluding tribes from the definition of
“employer” states that the Act does not apply to “the United States, a
corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States,
an Indian tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Co-
lumbia.”93 Although this vague language does not specifically define
“Indian tribe,” the legislator who proposed the amendment adding
this provision made its purpose clear. In the speech in which he in-
troduced the amendment, Senator Karl Mundt of South Dakota
stated:
The reason why it is necessary to add these words is that Indian
tribes, in many parts of the country, are virtually political subdivi-
sions of the Government. To a large extent many tribes control and
operate their own affairs, even to the extent of having their own
elected officials, courts and police forces.94
Senator Mundt went on to say that his amendment would allow
tribes to “conduct their own affairs” in “their capacity as a political
entity.”95 This speech by the amendment’s sponsor demonstrates that
the intent was to protect the employment decisions of tribes relating
to tribal government, not to deny non-Native American employees of
Native American-owned corporations their rights under Title VII.
Senator Mundt also proposed the amendment to Title VII pro-
tecting tribal entities from claims related to the hiring preferences of
Native Americans in and around reservations. The language of this
portion of the Act is unambiguous. It states:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to any business or
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any
publicly announced employment practice of such business or en-
terprise under which a preferential treatment is given to any indi-
                                                                                                                   
89. See supra note 60.
90. See supra Part V.A.
91. See 110 CONG. REC. 13702 (1964) (statement of Sen. Karl Mundt, Repub., S.D.);
see also infra text accompanying note 98.
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1994); see also infra text accompanying note 98.
93. Id. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added).
94. 110 CONG. REC. 13702 (1964) (statement of Sen. Karl Mundt, Repub., S.D.).
95. Id.
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vidual because he is living on or near a reservation.96
This language does not exempt tribes from discrimination suits
based on gender, religion, age, or race; it only permits tribal and geo-
graphically situated employers to exercise a hiring preference for
Native Americans.97 Senator Mundt’s two Title VII amendments
were not meant to protect tribal businesses from suits by non-Native
American employees. Rather, the purpose of these additions to the
Act was to “assure our American Indians of the continued right to
protect and promote their own interests and to benefit from Indian
preference programs.”98 The intent was not to allow tribes to profit
from illegal acts against non-Native Americans, but to help Native
Americans “decrease unemployment” and “integrate their people
into the affairs of the national community.”99 Courts ruling that Title
VII excludes tribal businesses from claims brought against them by
non-Native American employees have failed to consider this legisla-
tive intent. Thus, the reasoning of such cases is flawed.
B.   Tribal Businesses, Tribal Government, and Non-Economic
Entities
Tribally owned businesses facing an employment discrimination
suit may allege they are entitled to the same sovereign immunity de-
fense as are tribal governments. While there is some case law to
support such a claim, most have held that tribal companies do not
enjoy sovereign immunity from their dealings with non-Native
Americans.100 Most courts distinguish tribal affairs relating to gov-
ernment matters from tribal affairs pertaining to commercial activi-
ties, and hold that immunity does not protect the latter.101 On the
other hand, some jurisdictions hold that tribal companies are pro-
tected by the tribes’ sovereign immunity. Thus, they must expressly
waive that immunity to be subject to suit.102 The Supreme Court has
also implied that tribal corporations do not relinquish their immu-
nity simply by hiring non-Native Americans. In Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe103 the Supreme Court stated that it is the non-tribal
                                                                                                                   
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1994).
97. For example, a Title VII claim brought by an African-American tribal employee
alleging that she was passed over for a job given to a white employee based on discrimina-
tory motives would not be exempt. See id.
98. 110 CONG. REC. 13702 (1964) (statement of Sen. Karl Mundt, Repub., S.D.).
99. Id.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
102. See, e.g., Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe of Nebr., 430 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1970)
(holding that the tribe waived sovereign immunity by adopting a “sue or be sued” clause in
its corporate charter).
103. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
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members who subject themselves to the law of the tribe by choosing
to come to the reservation.104
One argument is that tribes should be exempt from employment
discrimination suits because employment matters are “internal af-
fairs” of the tribe, as they almost always occur on tribal lands and
involve tribal actions. Because it is well-established that tribes have
sovereignty over internal affairs,105 it could be argued that all em-
ployee matters fall within the protective cloak of tribal immunity.
In contrast, several courts have repeatedly found that corpora-
tions and other commercial activities operated by Native Americans
do not enjoy the sovereign immunity of the tribe. In Donovan v.
Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm ,106 the Ninth Circuit ruled that sovereign
immunity could not protect a Native-American-owned-and-operated
farm from a claim107 under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA).108 Coeur d’Alene reaffirmed the doctrine that tribal sover-
eignty applies only to tribal government and “purely intramural
matters such as conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules,
and domestic relations.”109 Because the farm employed non-Native
Americans, was a “normal commercial farming enterprise,” and did
not involve intramural matters of self-government, the court found it
fell within OSHA’s definition of “employer.”110
In another relevant case, Roberson v. Confederated Tribes ,111 the
Federal District Court of Oregon allowed a commercial entity of a
tribe to be sued under the National Labor Relations Act.112 The court
found a distinction between tribal employers acting in their govern-
mental capacities and tribal employers acting as corporations.113 Ac-
cording to the district court, tribally owned businesses that involve
the hiring of non-Native Americans and commercial activities with
non-Native American customers are not internal affairs involving
tribal government.114 As such, these activities should not receive the
benefit of tribal sovereign immunity.
Just as the economic activities of tribes should not be exempt
from Title VII, neither should they be exempt from other federal em-
ployment discrimination statutes such as the Americans With Dis-
                                                                                                                   
104. See id. at 147.
105. See supra text accompanying note 54-55.
106. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. See id. at 1115.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
109. Coeur d’ Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116.
110. Id.
111. 103 L.R.R.M (BNA) 2749 (D. Or. 1980).
112. See id. at 2750.
113. See id. (citing the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 476-477 (1994)).
114. See id. at 2751.
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abilities Act (ADA),115 the ADEA, or section 1981. Although it can be
argued that the ADA explicitly exempts tribal businesses, no court
has ever ruled on the issue.116 However, the ADA contains language
concerning Native Americans that is modeled almost precisely after
the language in Title VII.117 Accordingly, the same argument can be
made that it does not exempt the commercial activities of tribes from
the Act.118 The ADEA and section 1981 do not mention Native
Americans at all in their text or legislative history. These statutes
allow non-Native American tribal employees of tribal businesses to
bring suit under a doctrine originated by the Supreme Court and de-
veloped by the Ninth Circuit known as the “Tuscarora Rule.”
C.  The Tuscarora Rule
The Tuscarora Rule stems from Couer d’ Alene’s interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Power Commission v. Tu s-
carora Indian Nation. 119 In Tuscarora, the Supreme Court ruled that
the Power Authority of the State of New York could take land from
the Tuscarora Indian Nation under the Federal Power Act.120 The
Tuscaroras argued that the Federal Power Act was a statute of gen-
eral applicability, and that Native Americans are exempt absent an
express intent by Congress stating otherwise.121 The Court found this
argument unpersuasive, stating “It is now well settled by many deci-
sions of this Court that a general statute in terms applying to all
persons includes Native Americans and their property interests.”122
Accordingly, it can be implied from the Tuscarora decision that Na-
tive Americans may be held liable under federal labor and employ-
ment statutes of general applicability.123
In Coeur d’Alene the Ninth Circuit specifically enumerated three
exceptions to the Tuscarora Rule.124 Native American tribes will be
exempt from any law of general applicability that is silent on the is-
                                                                                                                   
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
116. See Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 30, at 1376.
117. See id. at 1376 n.62; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i) (1994) (stating that “em-
ployer” does not include “an Indian tribe”).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 89-99.
119. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
120. See id. at 115-24. The Federal Power Act is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825
(1994).
121. See Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 115.
122. Id. at 116 (citing Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418 (1935)).
123. See Donovan v. Coeur d’ Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985).
See also supra text accompanying notes 106-10 for a more in-depth discussion of the Coeur
d’ Alene case. But cf. Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prod. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir.
1982) (stating that the Supreme Court has overruled by implication, or at least limited,
the Tuscarora decision).
124. See Coeur d’ Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (citing United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890
(9th Cir. 1980)).
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sue of applicability to Native American tribes if that law would affect
“exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters,”125
“abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties,”126 or if there is proof
by legislative intent that the statute was not meant to apply to
tribes.127 The court further stated that a tribe’s employment of non-
Native Americans was one indication that the business enterprise
was not an area of self-government.128
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Tuscarora Rule in De-
partment of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commi s-
sion.129 The Department of Labor  court ruled that the Tuscarora Rule
mandated that OSHA be applied to a tribally run mill, even though
the tribe had a treaty impliedly giving them the right to exclude
OSHA inspectors from coming on to the property.130 Notwithstanding
the fact that giving effect to the statue would effectively nullify the
second exception to the Tuscarora Rule, the court held that OSHA
applied despite the agreement.131
The Seventh Circuit also adopted the Tuscarora Rule in Smart v.
State Farm Insurance Co. 132 In Smart the court ruled that the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)133 applied to a group
insurance policy issued to tribal employees of the Chippewa Indian
Tribe.134 The Smart decision relied on the Tuscarora Rule by finding
that the federal statute would apply unless the tribe could demon-
strate that doing so would intrude on its self-governance or internal
affairs.135
Federal statutes and case law indicate that tribal businesses
should not be able to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to em-
ployment discrimination suits based on federal legislation brought
by non-Native American employees. Moreover, the language of Title
VII, as well as the Act’s legislative intent, demonstrate that tribally
owned companies should not be exempt from the statute.
                                                                                                                   
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. 935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991).
130. See id. at 184.
131. See id. at 187.
132. 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989). Other jurisdictions have also held that federal em-
ployment discrimination statutes apply to tribes, without necessarily basing those deci-
sions on the Tuscarora Rule. Interestingly, the very court that dismissed Roselius’ lawsuit
previously ruled that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) could be brought against the
Seminole Indians. See Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 574 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (“Although the Supreme Court has specifically reserved ruling on whether a claim
of national origin discrimination is cognizable under § 1981, . . . the trend among lower
courts seems to favor such a cause of action.” (citation omitted)).
133. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
134. See Smart, 868 F.2d at 938.
135. See id. at 933-34.
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VI.   POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF
EMPLOYEES AGAINST TRIBAL BUSINESSES
A.   Tribes and Tribal Companies Are No Longer “Financially
Fragile”
In the last four decades, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has
been drastically limited as it applies to the immunity of states and
other government entities, as well as in its application to foreign
sovereigns.136 The majority of states have had their immunity abol-
ished or greatly diminished by the courts.137 In addition, courts are
increasingly amenable to arguments that states have impliedly
waived their immunity138 and have been more likely to prohibit or
limit immunity where the state undertakes commercial endeavors.139
Federal courts have also placed more restrictions on the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as it applies to foreign countries, thus allowing
citizens with legitimate claims against foreign nations to have their
day in court.140
In contrast, although some limitations have been placed on tribal
immunity, Native American tribes continue to enjoy a more powerful
and comprehensive version of sovereign immunity.141 The policy ar-
gument used to justify this anomaly is the necessity of protecting
Native American tribes that are generally more impoverished and
have weaker economies than states or foreign countries.142
Specifically, it is argued that sovereign immunity should be ap-
plied to tribal businesses because if immunity is not applied, the re-
sulting financial loss would threaten the economic existence of the
“financially fragile” tribes.143 The United States Supreme Court indi-
rectly recognized that Native American economies should be pro-
tected in United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 144
While there are some statistics to support this argument, the recent
impressive economic successes of Native American tribes demon-
                                                                                                                   
136. See Thomas P. McLish, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Lim-
its, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 173, 174-77 (1988).
137. See id. at 174.
138. See id. at 175.
139. See id. at 176.
140. See id. at 177.
141. See id. at 173, 179-80.
142. See Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 8-9, 13-20; Rice, supra note 35, at
267-69, 294; Amelia A. Fogleman, Sovereign Immunity of Indian Tribes: A Proposal for
Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (1993).
143. See generally Recent Cases, 102 HARV. L. REV. 556, 558 (1988) (claiming that a
broad application of sovereign immunity is necessary to protect “financially fragile Indian
tribes”).
144. 309 U.S. 506, 511-13 (1940) (holding that a previous property judgment against
the tribe could not be the basis of a res judicata defense in a subsequent suit by the tribe
because judgment was void ab initio as a result of sovereign immunity).
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strate that this policy is no longer valid concerning most tribes.145
The cited statistics, which allegedly demonstrate that tribes are fi-
nancially unstable, were compiled prior to the huge successes of Na-
tive American casinos and businesses.146 For example, in Employ-
ment in Indian Country: Considerations Respecting Tribal Regul a-
tion of the Employer-Employee Relationships ,147 the author cited six-
year-old statistics to support his claim that Native American tribes
were impoverished.148 The author pointed out that at the time of the
census Native Americans had the lowest per capita income of any
ethnic group in the United States.149 The author cited to these fig-
ures as the reason for other dire statistics from the same year.150
Similarly, other authors have relied on pre-1990 surveys to indicate
rampant current unemployment on Native American reservations.151
These authors assert that the survival of Native American tribes
depends upon their ability to make a living.152 In order to make a
living, they argue, tribal members must have the freedom to invest
money in economic ventures and conduct business in a manner “con-
sistent with the culture, values and traditions of the various
tribes.”153 Some authorities claim that tribally operated businesses
may be the only source of income for a tribe, other than federal sub-
sidies.154 Thus, they argue that the operation of tribal corporations,
including all employee-related decisions, should be considered a
matter of “internal affairs” and well within the scope of sovereign
immunity.155
Despite the dire statistics from several years ago, many tribes
have recently enjoyed explosive economic growth.156 In light of this
                                                                                                                   
145. See infra text accompanying notes 158-71.
146. See Rice, supra note 35, at 267 n.1.
147. 72 N.D. L. REV. 267 (1996).
148. See id. at 267-68 (citing 1990 census figures).
149. See Rice, supra note 35, at 267 n.1 (noting that according to the census statistics,
the average per capita income of Native Americans in 1990 was $8328, while the average
income for whites was $15,687).
150. See id. (noting that the mortality rate for Native Americans was considerably
higher in 1990 for certain causes of death, i.e., tuberculosis, 440% greater than the gen-
eral population; alcoholism, 430% higher; accidents, 165% higher; and homicide, 50% per-
cent greater).
151. See, e.g, Getches & Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 8.
152. See, e.g, Rice, supra note 35, at 268.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 294; Limas, supra note 30, at 690.
155. See Rice, supra note 35, at 295.
156. See generally Buffalo & Wadzinksi, supra note 30, at 1366 (characterizing the re-
cent prosperity among Native American tribes as “unprecedented economic growth and
development”); Bilezerian, supra note 30, at 463-65; Williams, supra note 31 (asserting
that casino gambling on Native American reservation is a $6 billion a year industry);
Pacheco, supra note 30, at 49; Rice, supra note 35, at 294 (boasting of the continued suc-
cess of the tribes’ “various economic endeavors” that contradicts his earlier portrayal of
the dire economic conditions of the tribes).
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phenomenal upswing in Native American economies, the policy of
protecting “financially fragile” tribes is outdated. In particular, this
policy should no longer apply to tribally owned industries that gross
billions of dollars every year.157
Many of the tribes’ successes have resulted from the opening of
high stakes casinos on Native American reservations pursuant to the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.158 A prime example is the
Mashantucket Pequot tribe of Connecticut, which began the reserva-
tion casino craze in 1990159 and now owns the largest casino in the
entire Western Hemisphere.160 The Foxwoods Casino, located on the
Pequots’ reservation, is a 139,000 square foot facility that includes
shops, hotels, restaurants, theaters, and a planned theme park.161
The tiny tribe, which has only about 275 members, employed 6900
workers with an estimated annual payroll of $226 million as of
1994.162 The Foxwoods Casino has been so lucrative that the tribe re-
cently made a donation of $10 million to the Smithsonian Institu-
tion.163
The Mashantucket Pequots may be the most extreme example,
but they are not alone in reaping the benefits of high stakes gam-
bling on reservations. Hundreds of tribes in twenty-three different
states own gaming operations estimated to generate as much as $6
billion a year in revenue.164 These astronomical profits are made all
the more lucrative because Native Americans are exempt from state
taxes on income that is earned on reservations.165
The new-found prosperity of many Native American tribes is not
limited solely to profits generated from casino gambling. An investi-
gation in 1987 revealed that Native Americans owned 21,380 com-
panies in the United States.166 These firms generated an estimated
$911 million in revenue in 1987.167 Included among these enterprises
was a “tribally owned federally chartered” bank in Montana and
three companies owned by the Lummi tribe of Washington, which
                                                                                                                   
157. See Williams, supra note 31.
158. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994); see also supra note 31.
159. See generally Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2nd Cir.
1990) (holding that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act forced the state of Connecticut to
negotiate in good faith with the tribe over opening a casino on the reservation).
160. See Bilezerian, supra note 30, at 463.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See Williams, supra note 31; Bilezerian, supra note 30, at 465; Kim Bell, Casino
Plans Alarm Town; Tribe Eyes Seneca, Mo., For Gambling Operation, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Oct. 8, 1995, at A1. The Seminole Indians, against whom Roselius filed suit,
gross an estimated $10 million annually from high stakes bingo and other forms of gam-
ing. See Anetta Miller, Indian Tribes Incorporated, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 5, 1988, at 40.
165. See McClanahan v. Arizona St. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 179-81 (1973).
166. See Pacheco, supra note 30, at 49 n.2.
167. See id.
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have boasted annual sales estimated at $34 million.168 Other exam-
ples of multi-million dollar Native American corporations include an
electronics assembly plant operated by the Cherokee nation, which
had a annual payroll of $9 million in 1987,169 and various enterprises
by the Choctaws of Mississippi that qualify them as one of the top
twenty employers in the state.170
It would be presumptuous to claim that this increased prosperity
will solve all the hardships facing every single Native American
tribe, but it has made a difference. The Cabazon Band of Mission In-
dians, for example, reduced their unemployment rate from fifty per-
cent to zero and enjoyed a 400% increase in their standard of living
after opening tribally owned gaming enterprises.171 If tribes with
such resources still can not meet their economic needs, the cause
would presumably be mismanagement or some other difficulty,
rather than financial fragility.
The tribes profiting from the $6 billion generated annually by
gaming, as well as enjoying other major sources of revenue, could
hardly be characterized as “financially fragile.”172 These tribes
should be held accountable for wrongs committed against the non-
Native American employees who contribute the labor that allows
tribes the luxury of such financial fortune.
B.   Non-Native Americans Should Not Be Forced to Waive Their
Rights Provided by Federal Law
In light of the recent economic boom of tribal economies, the justi-
fication for the policy of ensuring that non-Native Americans do not
involuntarily waive the protections afforded them under federal em-
ployment discrimination statutes is even stronger. Recently, Con-
gress expressed a clear intent to ensure that employees do not forfeit
their rights under the ADEA absent an explicit and consensual
waiver. In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA to state that “[a]n in-
dividual may not waive any right or claim under this chapter unless
                                                                                                                   
168. See id.
169. See David Owen, Indians Dealing on New Terms, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1987, at 6,
10.
170. See id. Another immensely profitable industry for the tribes has been tourism.
For example, the Chemehuevi tribe of California draws 150,000 visitors annually to a tri-
bally owned water park and operates a restaurant that grosses $4 million annually. See
Alan Abrahamson, Tribes’ Immunity Sparks Criticism, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1991, at A3.
171. See Haya El Nasser, Critics Want Reservation Gaming Curbs, USA TODAY, May
20, 1993, at A1.
172. This is especially relevant when considering that the casino run by the Mashan-
tucket Pequot tribe is a larger enterprise than any single casino run by Donald Trump or
Steve Wynn, both multi-millionaire players in America’s casino industry, and who, unlike
the Native Americans, must pay taxes on their revenues. Neither Trump nor Wynn are
able to avoid suits brought by employees under Title VII.
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the waiver is knowing and voluntary.”173 The amendment requires
that such a waiver must be part of a written agreement that is un-
derstandable, must refer to the rights covered by the ADEA, and
must advise the employee to consult an attorney.174 In addition, Con-
gress has incorporated other safeguards for employees waiving their
rights, including a requirement that such employees receive consid-
eration in exchange for the waiver and have a waiting period during
which they can “consider the agreement.”175
Additionally, the Supreme Court has ruled that an em-
ployer/employee collective bargaining agreement may not be used to
waive any statutory cause of action of the employee. In Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. ,176 an African-American drill operator named
Harrell Alexander, Sr. accused his employers of firing him based on
racial discrimination.177 Because Alexander signed a collective bar-
gaining agreement that contained an arbitration clause, the dispute
was arbitrated.178 Subsequent to the arbitrator’s decision, Alexander
filed a claim under Title VII in federal court.179 The District Court of
Colorado granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants be-
cause Alexander agreed to settle any disputes through arbitration
and the collective bargaining agreement barred him from bringing
suit.180 After the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision, Alexander ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court.181
The Court ruled for Alexander, stating: “We are unable to accept
the proposition that petitioner waived his cause of action under Title
VII . . . . [W]e think it is clear that there can be no prospective waiver
of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”182 The Court reasoned that
the policy of Title VII is “absolute” and represents Congress’s “com-
mand that each employee be free from discriminatory practices.”183
One exception to this may be in the event of a voluntary waiver by
the employee.184 The Court found that such a waiver would only be
valid if it is a settlement to which the employee consented voluntar-
ily and knowingly.185 Because Alexander signed a collective bar-
gaining agreement and not an individual voluntary waiver, he did
                                                                                                                   
173. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978, 983
(codified at 29 U.S.C § 626(f)(1) (1994)).
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
177. See id. at 38-42.
178. See id. at 40-43.
179. See id. at 43.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 51.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 52.
185. See id. at 52 n.15.
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not forfeit his right to sue. Therefore, the Court held that the Title
VII claim could not be dismissed.186
The Court recently found, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,187 that while employees may voluntarily waive their proce-
dural rights to a trial under federal employment statutes, they may
not involuntarily surrender their substantive rights.188 The Court
ruled that an employee had waived his right to a jury trial under the
ADEA by signing an agreement to arbitrate any grievances he had
against his employer.189 The rationale of the Gilmer decision was
that the right to a trial by jury under statutory claims can be waived
through arbitration agreements.190 This is permissible only because a
plaintiff waiving the right to trial in favor of arbitration does not
“‘forgo the substantive rights  afforded by the statute; it only submits
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum.’”191
The court distinguished Alexander as a case in which an arbitration
clause threatened substantive rights, rather than the limitation of
certain procedural rights as was the case in Gilmer.192 In holding
that agreements to arbitrate employment discrimination claims are
valid only if they allow a plaintiff to assert her substantive rights
under the statute,193 the Gilmer Court reaffirmed that employers
may not force their employees to involuntarily waive these rights.
The Supreme Court has also specifically ruled that citizens
should be protected by the laws of the United States, even when they
venture on to tribal lands. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe ,194
the Court limited sovereign immunity to matters that would not in-
terfere with the interests of the United States.195 The Court held that
tribal sovereignty should not interfere with the protection of U.S.
citizens from “unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”196
Forcing non-Native Americans to involuntarily waive their rights
under federal statutes such as Title VII would certainly be an intru-
sion on those employees’ personal liberties, and therefore tribal sov-
ereign immunity should be denied.
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Most non-Native American employees would not realize they were
waiving certain rights by accepting a tribal job. Without being aware
that they are forfeiting their rights, this waiver can hardly be con-
sidered “knowing and voluntary.”197 Because such an involuntary
waiver of substantive rights is prohibited by the Supreme Court,
employment discrimination statutes should apply to tribally owned
companies and tribes. Tribes should not be allowed to profit from
non-Native American labor and then subsequently deny all liability
stemming from their interaction with that workforce.
C.   Allowing Employment Discrimination Claims Against Native-
American-Owned Businesses Would Benefit the Tribes Themselves
As tribal corporations continue to make millions of dollars and
have increasing interaction with non-Native American consumers,
businesses, and employees, the likelihood of non-Native Americans
filing legal grievances against the tribes increases. If wealthy tribes
continue to avoid legitimate legal claims simply by claiming sover-
eign immunity,198 the public will eventually demand that Native
Americans be held accountable.199 This in turn, could lead to Con-
gress using its plenary power over tribal immunity to eliminate the
doctrine partially or entirely.
The tribes can avoid this by voluntarily waiving a portion of their
immunity on their own terms. Tribal ordinances and corporate char-
ters could limit the waiver to tribal businesses while maintaining
sovereign immunity for the tribe’s government and other re-
sources.200 To avoid depleting any limited resources, limitations on
damages could be incorporated.201 A voluntary partial waiver of im-
munity would also benefit tribes by encouraging further economic
investment by non-Native Americans who are hesitant about enter-
ing into business with an entity that may be immune from suit.202
For example, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, one of the biggest Na-
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tive American success stories, have waived immunity for their casino
gambling operations, limiting their liability to $1 million.203
VII.   POSSIBLE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO NON-NATIVE AMERICAN
TRIBAL EMPLOYEES
Under current law, there are many different legal options for a
non-Native American employee claiming employment discrimination
against a tribe. In the most extreme case, where a court holds sover-
eign immunity bars such a claim, an employee can sue the individ-
ual responsible for the discrimination. Courts have held that sover-
eign immunity does not apply to the actions of individual officers of
the tribe.204 Although Title VII does not allow for individual liabil-
ity,205 nothing prevents a non-Native American from bringing inten-
tional tort claims against the individual defendant. This may be an
unsatisfactory remedy, however, because the assets of an individual
tribal officer are likely to be less than those of the tribe.
Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)206 could also be used
to fashion a private cause of action. The Act prohibits tribal govern-
ments from infringing on the civil rights of persons over which they
have jurisdiction.207 Among the rights protected by the statute is the
right to be secure from the denial of “liberty or property without due
process of law.”208 Under this language, terminating an employee’s
job based upon a discriminatory motive and then claiming that sov-
ereign immunity bars the suit could be considered a denial of liberty
without due process.209
Although ICRA is generally thought of as a statute providing cer-
tain rights for Native Americans, it also is applicable to non-Native
Americans on tribal land. As Justice Rehnquist stated in Oliphant,
the legislative history behind ICRA demonstrates that the proposed
statute was worded to protect “American Indians,” but was passed
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only after being modified to include “any person.”210 The Court inter-
preted this language of ICRA as meaning that the statute applies to
all persons under the jurisdiction of tribal governments, regardless
of whether they are Native American or not.211 The Supreme Court,
as well as some tribal courts, have held that in enacting the ICRA,
Congress used its plenary power to expressly waive Native American
sovereign immunity.212 As a result, a non-Native American employee
may be able to use this rationale to bring a claim against her em-
ployers through ICRA.
The most successful strategy for a non-Native American em-
ployee, of course, may be to bring a claim utilizing the federal case
law holding that employment discrimination statutes should apply
to tribally owned businesses.213 The best possible remedy for a non-
Native American tribal employee who has been wronged, however, is
not currently in existence. This remedy would be an explicit act of
Congress, using its plenary power over tribal immunity, to make it
clear that tribes cannot escape responsibility for employment dis-
crimination.214
VIII.   CONCLUSION
It is contrary to all notions of fairness that plaintiffs such as
Kristine Roselius are denied legitimate legal claims merely because
their employers are Native American tribes. As the tribes and their
entities continue to prosper economically and hire increasing num-
bers of non-Native Americans, courts will find it more difficult to jus-
tify an application of sovereign immunity that will deny employees
their rights under federal law. The current state of the law regarding
tribal immunity and its specific application to employment discrimi-
nation is vague, unpredictable, and contradictory. This area should
be clarified, either by the judiciary or by Congress.
Because of public, economic, and political pressures, tribes fre-
quently choose to voluntarily waive their immunity for economic en-
terprises.215 However, Title VII claims should not be dependent on
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the fact that the non-Native American plaintiff was employed by the
tribal entity instead of the sovereign tribe. In the face of such waiv-
ers, Congress should still find it necessary to enact legislation pro-
tecting the rights of non-Native American tribal employees. Until
Congress, the courts, or the tribes themselves clarify this issue,
plaintiffs such as Kristine Roselius will continue to struggle to adju-
dicate lawful claims of sexual discrimination.
